The rupee’s decline is part of the solution, not the problem

The rupee’s decline is part of the solution, not the problem, The Print, May 18, 2026.

The power of prices in times of crisis

Business Standard May 18, 2026

When an economy is hit by a shock—whether a war, or a pandemic—it can adjust in two broad ways: through prices or through administrative controls imposed by the State. Market economies rely primarily on prices. Centrally planned systems depend on bureaucratic allocation. The distinction matters because prices allow millions of households and firms to adjust voluntarily, whereas controls require the State to decide who gets what, and at what price. The current disruptions in global energy markets offer a useful illustration of why this difference matters.

Consider a simple example. Suppose an economy normally consumes 100 units of fuel, but a global disruption reduces available supply to 80. Since supply cannot quickly increase, demand must fall to match it. This can happen in only two ways: either the State forces demand down through rationing and controls, or prices rise and people voluntarily reduce consumption until demand matches supply.

The second mechanism is often far more efficient and less disruptive. Let’s understand why.

First, prices perform two critical functions: they convey information and shape incentives. In many ways, the market is like a giant opinion poll—except people back their views with money. Prices aggregate the decisions of millions of consumers, businesses, traders, and investors into a single signal about scarcity or abundance.

When fuel prices rise people respond by driving less, postponing discretionary travel, or shifting to public transport, while businesses cut wasteful energy use or seek alternatives. Producers receive the opposite signal: higher prices encourage them to increase supply, reroute shipments, or find substitutes.

The alternative is for the State to make these decisions. But this raises difficult questions. If cooking gas becomes scarce, should priority go to households or restaurants? Small eateries or luxury hotels? Should fertiliser subsidies go equally to all farmers or mainly to small farmers?

There are no easy answers because no State can fully understand the preferences of millions of households and businesses. Prices solve this coordination problem more effectively by allowing people to adjust their own behaviour as conditions change. This preserves economic freedom and ensures that decisions about what to consume, conserve, or prioritise are made by those directly affected, rather than by a central authority with limited information.

Secondly, State interventions often create unintended consequences. Export bans on agricultural products can depress farm prices and discourage production, while restrictions on gold imports can lead to shortages, black markets, and smuggling. Artificially suppressing prices may feel comforting initially, but the costs eventually appear elsewhere, often through higher taxpayer burden.

Since the West Asia war began, India’s state-owned oil companies have incurred losses of around Rs 1 lakh crore as fuel prices were kept largely unchanged. In effect, consumers face a trade-off: either reduce fuel consumption today in response to higher prices or pay more than Rs 1 lakh crore in taxes at a future date. Most countries have raised fuel prices since the war started including Malaysia, Pakistan, and Philippines where prices have gone up by 50%. India, in contrast, has adjusted the least, allowing fuel prices to go up by only 3%.

Finally, repeated State intervention can create uncertainty because people stop responding to market signals and start trying to anticipate State actions instead. Businesses delay investment decisions because they do not know what new controls, or bans may appear next. This weakens confidence in the broader policy environment.

Over time, mature market economies have learned to trust prices. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe allowed energy prices to rise, which encouraged conservation, reduced demand, and attracted LNG supplies from around the world, helping avoid a deeper shortage. The US has followed a similar approach during the current West Asia conflict. Despite being largely self-sufficient in oil, gasoline prices have risen by about 45 per cent, allowing the market to allocate scarce fuel more efficiently.

This adjustment mechanism is also transparent and reversible. As supply conditions improve, prices naturally fall back, allowing normal economic activity to resume without the State having to dismantle complex controls and restrictions.

India itself has undergone this learning process gradually over the past few decades. There was a time when people expected the State to determine prices of petrol, steel, or airline tickets. Today, most accept that these prices move with market conditions. Yet large shocks such as wars still trigger demands for intervention. Policymakers increasingly need to recognise that markets are better at determining prices than the State. Where prices remain controlled, such as petrol and diesel, a more effective approach may be to announce future price increases in advance, giving households and firms time to adjust.

Prices are not the problem. They are how economies adjust to shocks. The role of policymakers is not to suppress these signals, but to protect the vulnerable in a targeted manner while allowing the price system to continue doing its job.

Let the rupee move freely: RBI intervention risks more harm than good

Business Standard April 21, 2026

The Indian rupee has been under intense scrutiny in recent weeks, with its depreciation against the US dollar attracting widespread attention. Much of the commentary has framed this decline as a sign of weakness, often applauding the central bank’s efforts to resist it. But this view overlooks a basic point: The exchange rate is a price. And like any price, it must adjust to shifts in demand and supply. Trying to hold it at an artificial level does not fix underlying imbalances — it only postpones the adjustment and risks making the eventual correction more disruptive.

Consider a familiar example. When the monsoon fails, the supply of vegetables falls short of demand. Prices rise, and this serves a purpose: Households cut back consumption, and farmers are encouraged to bring as much produce as possible to the market. The imbalance begins to correct itself.

Now imagine the government steps in to prevent prices from rising. The gap between demand and supply does not disappear—it simply persists. To manage it, the government would then have to impose restrictions, such as rationing or limits on sales. In the end, consumers would face shortages and reduced access, defeating the very purpose of the intervention. This is precisely why governments typically allow such prices to adjust rather than trying to control them.

The same logic applies to the foreign exchange market. When demand for dollars exceeds supply, the price of the dollar rises—and the rupee falls. What we are seeing today is simply this basic market adjustment at work.

So why is demand for dollars rising faster than supply? There are two main reasons.

First, India has been running a current account deficit, which was around $40 billion in 2025-26, but foreign capital inflows were insufficient to finance it. This imbalance helps explain why the rupee was already under pressure last year.

Second, the war in West Asia has made matters worse. By pushing up the prices of key imports, it is likely to widen the current account deficit further—potentially to around $80 billion this year.

As a result, India faces a difficult challenge: It needs to attract around $80 billion in foreign capital at a time when global investors are becoming more risk-averse and pulling money out of emerging markets into safer developed economies. In such a situation, the most practical way to restore balance is to allow the rupee to depreciate.

How does depreciation help? In much the same way that higher vegetable prices restore balance—by reducing demand and encouraging supply. The exchange rate works through two key channels.

First, a weaker rupee helps restore balance through trade. As it depreciates, Indian goods become cheaper for foreign buyers, boosting exports and bringing in more dollars. At the same time, imports become more expensive, which reduces domestic demand for foreign goods. Together, these effects help narrow the current account deficit.

Second, a weaker rupee makes Indian financial assets cheaper for foreign investors. In dollar terms, Indian stocks and bonds now cost less, which can make them more attractive. This can encourage foreign investment into Indian markets, bringing in dollars and helping to finance the current account deficit.

In contrast, if policymakers try to hold the exchange rate at an artificial level, the underlying imbalance does not disappear—it lingers, and can even intensify over time.

The main reason is that the market is aware of the $80 billion funding gap—and that the central bank cannot finance it indefinitely by selling dollars, since it will eventually run out of reserves. Unless this gap is expected to close on its own, some depreciation of the rupee becomes inevitable. Faced with this prospect, firms and households will naturally look for ways to safeguard their wealth, including shifting part of it abroad.

There is another concern. When the central bank tries to manage the exchange rate, the private sector shifts its focus from market signals to guessing the central bank’s next move. This uncertainty can itself be destabilising. If the currency is supported through restrictions—such as the recent curbs on gold and silver imports—it can unsettle the private sector and raise fears of further controls. Such fears can trigger precautionary behaviour, with firms and households pre-emptively moving money out of the country, adding to the pressure on the rupee.

In other words, attempts by the central bank to hold back the rupee risk doing more harm than good — by eroding confidence, fuelling uncertainty, and distorting market signals. This can widen the gap between dollar demand and supply, discourage investment, and complicate economic recovery. The exchange rate is not the problem; it is the mechanism through which the problem is corrected. Holding it back only delays the adjustment and makes the eventual cost higher.

In these circumstances, the most effective policy is also the simplest: Allow the rupee to move freely and do its job as the economy’s primary shock absorber.

From scale to depth: Dismantling frictions within India’s financial inclusion juggernaut

From scale to depth: Dismantling frictions within India’s financial inclusion juggernaut, Ideas for India, April 20, 2026.

RBI’s rupee defence may backfire

Business Standard April 14, 2026

Since the onset of the West Asia conflict, the Indian rupee has come under sustained pressure against the dollar. In response, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stepped up its defence of the currency. However, the measures announced by it risk backfiring, disrupting the foreign exchange market, and intensifying the very pressures they seek to contain, with broader consequences for the economy.

When the war broke out in late February 2026, the RBI, backed by foreign exchange reserves of nearly $730 billion, intervened aggressively. It sold over $30 billion in the spot market in March alone and built up a large short dollar position in the forward market. Despite these efforts, the rupee continued to weaken.

In late March, the RBI shifted strategy. It imposed regulatory restrictions —barring banks from taking positions in the offshore non-deliverable forward (NDF) market and capping their daily onshore FX exposure to $100 million each. These measures appeared to have some immediate effect, with the rupee stabilising briefly. But the key question is whether this strategy can hold.

There are strong reasons to doubt it.

The first concern is the sweeping and abrupt nature of the measures. The RBI did not merely restrict new positions; it required banks to unwind existing ones, reportedly at a cost of ₹4,000–5,000 crore. In effect, banks were penalised for actions that were fully legitimate at the time. Such retrospective costs risk undermining confidence and making banks more cautious in FX markets. Lower participation could reduce liquidity. And when liquidity dries up, currencies tend to become more volatile, not less.

This is particularly troubling because the activity being curtailed was neither illegal nor questionable. Much of it was simple arbitrage — buying dollars in the onshore market and selling them offshore and keeping exchange rates in the two markets aligned. These trades were perfectly normal and had been explicitly permitted by the RBI itself.

Indeed, for several years the RBI had encouraged offshore trading in the rupee as part of a broader push to internationalise the currency. A large offshore market has developed in centres such as Singapore, London, and Dubai, with an estimated $70 billion in daily turnover. By suddenly barring Indian banks from participating in this market, the RBI has reversed its earlier stance. While the central bank has described the move as temporary, such an abrupt policy shift raises concerns about consistency.

To the market, these measures send an uncomfortable signal — that the situation may be more serious than the RBI’s reserves alone can handle. Instead of reassuring investors, this risks eroding confidence. The opposite of what the intervention was meant to achieve.

There is also a broader concern. Banning legitimate market activity raises questions about what might come next. Investors may begin to worry about further restrictions — such as limits on outward remittances — and respond by moving funds out pre-emptively. Foreign investors may become wary of bringing capital into India if there is a risk that exit routes could later be constrained. If such fears take hold, the RBI’s actions could end up triggering the very capital outflows it is trying to prevent.

At the same time, these measures risk impairing the functioning of the FX market itself. In periods of heightened volatility such as the present, firms need to hedge their currency risk. By capping banks’ FX positions and limiting their participation, these measures are likely to raise hedging costs. Early reports suggest this is already happening. As Indian banks step back, hedging has become more expensive — precisely when foreign portfolio investors need certainty on exchange rates before committing capital. This makes India a less attractive destination for investment at a time when capital inflows are crucial.

This brings us to the fundamental problem: The pressure on the rupee is not merely cyclical but structural.

For some time now, capital inflows into India have not been sufficient to finance even a modest current account deficit of around 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). This imbalance helps explain why the rupee was already among Asia’s weakest currencies in 2025, even before the war.

The West Asia conflict has only worsened this situation. Higher global oil and gas prices are widening the current account deficit, reflecting India’s heavy dependence on energy imports. At the same time, capital inflows are weakening due to global risk aversion and a decline in investor appetite for Indian assets. In such circumstances, some depreciation of the rupee is not only inevitable but necessary to restore external balance.

Against this backdrop, it is unclear what the RBI’s measures can realistically achieve. At best, they may delay the needed adjustment. At worst, they could exacerbate underlying pressures by undermining confidence and discouraging capital inflows.

The costs are already being felt beyond the FX market. Uncertainty around the FX strategy has pushed up market interest rates, amplifying the growth-dampening effects of the energy shock.

Perhaps the restrictions will be rolled back in due course. But even then, restoring confidence will take much longer. 

RBI's clarity of communication will be as critical as the policy itself

Business Standard March 17, 2026

The Reserve Bank of India will announce its next monetary policy on April 9. While every meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) draws close scrutiny, this one comes at a particularly critical juncture because of the conflict in West Asia. Even if the MPC leaves the policy rate unchanged, its communication will be crucial in calming financial markets amid heightened uncertainty. Markets will look for clear guidance on how the MPC interprets the uncertainty and what it implies for the future course of monetary policy.

In inflation-targeting economies such as India, communication is a key instrument of monetary policy. Financial markets analyse MPC statements and the governor’s remarks for signals about the future path of interest rates. When central bank communication becomes complex or ambiguous, market volatility tends to rise (Sengupta and Mathur, 2019). This matters even more in periods of uncertainty, when investors and firms struggle to form clear expectations about the economic outlook.

Two main sources of uncertainty will shape the backdrop to the MPC’s decision in the coming weeks.

The first is the war in West Asia. Until recently, India’s macroeconomic conditions appeared stable, with strong growth and moderate inflation. That stability has quickly eroded.

The conflict has disrupted supplies of key commodities such as crude oil, natural gas, and fertilisers. India imports nearly 90 per cent of its crude oil, about half of its natural gas, and roughly a quarter to a third of its fertiliser needs, much of it from West Asia. Prolonged disruptions could push up domestic energy and fertiliser prices and eventually feed into food prices and headline inflation.

Inflation had already begun to edge up even before these shocks. The consumer price index-based inflation rose to 3.2 per cent in February, a nine-month high. Although still below the RBI’s 4 per cent target, the margin for comfort has narrowed compared with June 2025 to January 2026, when inflation averaged about 1.5 per cent.

At the same time, disruptions to global trade routes could hurt exports and production, given that West Asia accounts for roughly 15 per cent of India’s exports. Higher energy costs may further weaken output and growth. Supply shortages often force adjustments that compress demand. The government has asked domestic gas producers to divert supplies towards households, reducing availability for industries such as plastics, chemicals, fertilisers and aluminium. Restaurants and other service sectors that rely on gas may face higher costs and weaker sales. Rising jet fuel prices are also pushing up airfares, which could dampen travel and tourism demand.

This creates a policy dilemma for the MPC. Should it prioritise containing inflation and adopt a more hawkish stance, or support growth as uncertainty rises? The committee will also need to clarify whether the recent increase in inflationary pressures is likely to be temporary or could it generate second-round effects that require a policy response. Markets will look for clarity on how the MPC balances these risks, without which, uncertainty about the policy outlook will persist.

It is also worth noting that even though the RBI reduced the repo rate by a cumulative 125 basis points in 2025 to support growth, long-term bond yields have not fallen. The yield on the 10-year government security has risen to around 6.75-6.80 per cent, close to levels seen before the rate-cutting cycle began. Normally, bond yields decline when policy rates fall. This divergence reflects rising uncertainty in financial markets. A clear articulation of the MPC’s assessment of macroeconomic risks could help stabilise expectations and prevent further increases in yields during this volatile period.

The second source of uncertainty is the new CPI index introduced in February. The revision changes both the weightings assigned to items and the composition of the consumption basket, which has expanded from 299 to 358 items. The weight of food has fallen sharply from about 46 per cent to around 37 per cent. Within food, the share of volatile items such as cereals has declined, while relatively stable components such as protein-rich foods have gained importance. A lower food weight may make headline inflation less sensitive to temporary supply shocks, such as monsoon variability. If inflation becomes less volatile, monetary policy could also become more predictable.

But the implications are not automatic. Markets will want to understand how the MPC interprets the new index. Does the change in weightings alter its assessment of inflation dynamics? Will food shocks play a smaller role in policy decisions? Could the behaviour of core (non-food, non-fuel) inflation change? Clear communication on these questions will help stabilise expectations as the new CPI becomes the basis for monetary policy.

As the MPC prepares its April 9 statement, clarity of communication will matter as much as the policy decision itself. Minimising surprises and setting clear expectations will help ensure monetary policy remains effective in the volatile months ahead.

India-EU trade pact moves from promise to reality but challenges persist

Business Standard February 17, 2026

The announcement of a free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the European Union is a major turning point—not so much for its immediate gains, but for what it signals about India’s economic strategy. After several years of high tariffs and inward-looking policies, the deal reflects a clear recognition by the Indian government that exports must play a bigger role in driving growth. However, an FTA is only a framework. It creates opportunities, but it is not a cure-all. To fully benefit from this deal, India will still need significant domestic reforms.

The deal reflects the government’s confidence that Indian firms are capable of competing more strongly in global markets. Where does this confidence come from? In part, from the sheer room India has to expand its global presence. Despite being the world’s fourth-largest economy, India accounts for less than 2 per cent of global goods exports. Even a two-percentage-point rise in market share would effectively double exports.

Confidence also stems from global shifts. Supply chains are diversifying away from China, and European firms are seeking alternative production bases. With nearly 65 per cent of its population under 35 and significant untapped manufacturing potential, India is well placed to benefit.

Finally, the government’s confidence also comes from the opportunity that FTAs create. The EU pact offers Indian exporters preferential access to 450 million consumers across 27 countries—one of the world’s largest and richest markets. Alongside other proposed deals with the United States, Chile, Peru and the Eurasian Economic Union, it could help generate the millions of jobs India needs each year.

However, market access alone does not ensure higher exports or more jobs. To translate access into outcomes, India will need structural reforms that roll back protectionist barriers. Three such reforms will be key.

First, India’s trade regime requires reform. Tariffs on intermediate goods must be reduced if exports are to become a genuine growth engine. Indian firms cannot compete globally if key inputs remain costly. They need reliable access to low-cost components, supported by streamlined customs procedures and simpler regulations to minimise delays. Yet the recent Union Budget left most import duties unchanged, despite the need for rationalisation. India should also rethink its extensive use of Quality Control Orders (QCOs), which function as de facto import barriers. Although a few have been withdrawn, more than 700 remain, disrupting supply chains and creating uncertainty for firms planning production and exports.

Second, while the EU FTA may expand market access, it will not by itself attract large-scale manufacturing investment. That requires a credible investment protection framework. In 2015, India unilaterally terminated around 77 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), leaving foreign investors with limited recourse in disputes with domestic firms or the government. A revised Model BIT introduced in 2016 mandates that investors exhaust domestic legal remedies for five years before seeking international arbitration—terms few countries have accepted. As a result, India now has BITs with only a handful of relatively minor partners, while major global firms remain cautious about committing long-term capital.

Finally, India should seriously consider joining major regional trade groupings such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). These agreements go well beyond tariff cuts. They require members to strengthen domestic standards in labour laws, intellectual property, regulatory transparency and competition policy—areas where India needs reforms, but has found politically difficult to implement.

International commitments can help anchor domestic change. China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 shows how external discipline can accelerate internal reform. Joining high-standard regional agreements would similarly signal that India’s policy direction is stable and long-term. That credibility, in turn, can boost investor confidence and attract greater investment. 

India competes in a global trading system still shaped by China—a dominant exporter with deep manufacturing capabilities and highly integrated supply chains built over decades. In that context, the FTA with the EU is an important step forward. But it must mark the beginning of a larger transformation, not the end of reform. What India needs is a sustained commitment to trade openness. If it wants to become a global manufacturing hub and achieve its “Viksit Bharat 2047” goal, trade agreements must be backed by lower input tariffs, simpler regulations, stronger investment protection and deeper structural reforms.

Global supply chains are being reorganised in real time. The question is not whether opportunities exist—it is whether India will move fast and decisively enough to seize them.