Sunday, April 5, 2020

Covid-19: Policy Challenges And Traps In Restarting The Economy


Bloomberg Quint, April 6, 2020 (with Harsh Vardhan)

It is now widely acknowledged that the scale of the economic damage caused by the Covid-19 pandemic will be far greater than that caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, globally as well as for India.

There exists considerable uncertainty about the duration and depth of the crisis but one thing is becoming increasingly clear: dealing with the after-effects of Covid-19 will be a major economic policy challenge over the next few years. While some policy actions have been announced by the government and the Reserve Bank of India, they are interim measures and are not going to be adequate to support the economy. Given the uncertainty, policy responses are likely to be reactive. Here, we discuss a few challenges in fiscal, monetary and financial policies and also lay out some policy traps that must be avoided in order to prevent a long-term economic disaster.

Fiscal Conundrum

Let’s start with fiscal policy. Even assuming a conservative scenario where the government does not incur any additional expenses due to Covid-19, the deficit will be greater than the projected value in the 2020-21 budget. During the ongoing three-week-long lockdown, almost all economic activities have been suspended and most of these are unlikely to resume in the near future given the nature of the health shock. As a result, government revenues will fall drastically. Given the depressed equity market condition and global economic uncertainty, the disinvestment targets are unlikely to be met. Over and above this, much of the policy actions required to minimise the economic fallout of the shock will involve government spending.

It is almost certain that the government will not be able to adhere to its fiscal target for 2020-21 and will most likely breach it by a big margin.

In India, the fiscal deficit is supported by financial repression wherein the government borrows from a captive market of banks and other institutional lenders. In the pre-Covid19 period, total central and state government borrowing had already exceeded total household savings. Further borrowing will sharpen the yields in the bond market and crowd out private capital at a time when a large number of firms and households will need to borrow to stay afloat. The large-scale income losses of many businesses and households that are inevitable during this crisis imply that the savings rate is likely to fall. These factors leave little room for the government to increase its domestic borrowing.

Recently, a scheme has been announced to encourage foreign investment in government securities. With the global spread of the pandemic, foreign portfolio investors have already been taking money out of the Indian capital markets. Given the widespread risk aversion, it is unlikely that this route will bring in a lot of financing for the government. If anything, the widening fiscal deficit may lead to a sovereign rating downgrade or a lowering of the macro outlook which in turn will increase the risk premium demanded by FIIs. Therefore, the biggest policy challenge now will be financing the rise in the government deficit. The only favourable factor in this regard is the sharp decline in global oil prices which are expected to remain subdued given the worldwide decline in demand for oil.

The Risks To Print-And-Spend

Next comes monetary policy. There are now calls from certain quarters for the RBI to print money to finance the rise in the fiscal deficit, a practice that was prevalent in India but discontinued since 1997. Monetisation of fiscal deficit will create inflationary pressures, lead to greater uncertainty about future inflation, increase long-term interest rates and adversely impact growth, thereby defeating the very objective of supporting the economy.

All efforts to flatten the Corona curve would steepen the yield curve.

This move will violate India's inflation-targeting framework and attenuate the effectiveness of future monetary policy actions. It will also hurt the credibility of the government.

Financial Freeze?

Finally, in the financial sector, banks and non-banking finance companies will witness a precipitous rise in non-performing assets, both from the private corporate and the retail sectors as firms and households struggle to deal with this unprecedented shock. A large number of firms especially the micro, small and medium businesses and also self-employed individuals are likely to default on their bank and NBFC loans.

Rising NPAs will erode the capital of lenders at a time when they are expected to lend aggressively to revive economic growth.

With the stock market touching new lows every day, it will be difficult for private banks to raise capital and the strained fiscal situation will make it difficult for the government to recapitalise the public sector banks. Capital deficiency in the face of rising NPAs will lead to demands for ‘forbearance’ from the RBI. There may also be further easing of capital requirements by tweaking the risk weights or outright reduction of capital adequacy requirements, on the basis that Indian requirement has been tighter than international standards. The net result of such regulatory concessions would be that the banking sector will remain undercapitalised for some time and will hide its losses.

Rules Matter

When the Covid-19 shock hit India, the economy was still recovering from the twin balance sheet crisis, the seeds of which were sown in the years of regulatory forbearance of the post-2008 period. Postponement of NPA recognition helps to 'extend and pretend'. Soon the problem becomes too big to tackle and the damage to the economy becomes long-lasting. If allowed now, this will lead to a system-wide crisis as it did in 2016-17 post the asset quality review by RBI.

Defaults by firms would trigger a wave of bankruptcies.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has introduced, for the first time, a rigorous and disciplined process for dealing with bankruptcies. There will be a demand now to dilute the provisions of IBC. This could undermine the most important reform of the last decade and render the code ineffective.

In such extraordinary times, the temptation to ignore rules and frameworks, and apply discretion runs high. This approach is neither effective nor sustainable. Over the last two decades several important policy frameworks have been put in place – FRBM, inflation-targeting, Basel norms, IBC, etc. These frameworks provide institutional support to policy decisions and must be adhered to in the interest of the long-term health of the economy. Policy responses to the ongoing crisis potentially risk undermining these frameworks and must be decided with utmost care and caution.

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

The problem with re-basing GDP estimates


The Hindu, November 13, 2019 (with R Nagaraj)

In the next few months, the Central Statistics Office (CSO) proposes to replace the gross domestic product (GDP) series of 2011-12 base year with a new set of National Accounts using 2017-18 as the base-year. According to the chief statistician, this will be done as soon as the new consumer expenditure survey and the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) results become available. Normally, rebasing is a routine administrative decision of any national statistics office.

Background to the dispute

But these are not normal times in India for users and producers of the national accounts. For the past four years there has been a raging controversy over the current GDP figures on account of questionable methodologies and databases used. According to official data, the annual economic growth rate has sharply decelerated to about 5% in the latest quarter, from over 8% a few years ago. The reality may, however, be far worse. Independent studies using multiple statistical methods to validate the official GDP estimates by the former Chief Economic Adviser, Arvind Subramanian, and Sebastian Morris of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, have suggested that the annual GDP growth rates during the last few years may have been overestimated by 0.36 to 2.5 percentage points.

Why is there such distrust in the official GDP figures? To understand the origins of the dispute, one has to go back to early 2015 when the CSO released a new series of GDP with 2011-12 as base-year, replacing the earlier series with the base-year 2004-05. Periodic rebasing of GDP series every seven to 10 years is carried out to account for the changing economic structure and relative prices. Such re-basing usually led to a marginal rise in the absolute GDP size on account of better capturing of domestic production using improved methods and new databases. However, the underlying growth rates seldom change, meaning that the rebasing does not alter the underlying pace of economic expansion.

The 2011-12 base year revision was different, however. The absolute GDP size in the new base year 2011-12 contracted by 2.3% (compared to the old series), and the annual GDP growth rate went up sharply from 4.8% in the old series to 6.2% in 2013-14. Similarly, the manufacturing sector growth rate for 2013-14, swung from (-) 0.7% in the old series to (+) 5.3% in the 2011-12 series. Such large variations in growth rates for the same year may be justified if the material conditions of production warranted. But the higher growth estimates recorded by the new series did not square with related economic indicators such as bank credit growth, industrial capacity utilisation or fixed investment growth. Thus began the questioning of the new GDP series.

Demonetisation as shock

The suspicion of official output estimates became particularly intense after the demonetisation of high valued currency notes in November 2016. By most analyses, the economic shock severely hurt output and employment. For example, the Ministry of Finance’s Report on Income Tax Reforms for Building New India (September 2018; convenor: Arbind Modi), provided data on fixed investment in the private corporate sector based on actual corporate tax returns. It shows that the fixed investment to GDP ratio fell sharply from 7.5% in 2015-16 to 2.8% in 2016-17 (suspected to be on account of demonetisation). However, surprisingly, the ratio in the national accounts went up from 11.7% in 2015-16 to 12% in 2016-17.

Similarly, chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Gita Gopinath’s academic research paper (co-authored) published by the highly regarded National Bureau of Economic Research in the U.S. in May 2019 showed an adverse effect of demonetisation on growth rate. Yet, the official GDP for the year 2016-17 grew at 8.2%, the highest in a decade.

The root of the problem

The source of the problem, according to many economists, is the underlying methodologies for calculating GDP (in the 2011-12 series) which they claim are deeply flawed, as well as the new dataset used in estimating the private corporate sector’s contribution. Some of the recent, prominent criticisms are as follows.

In a first, the CSO estimated value addition in the private corporate sector using the statutory filing of financial results with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The private corporate sector accounts for about a third of GDP, and spans all production sectors, and roughly about half of the private corporate sector output originates in manufacturing. The database of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has been criticised by many as unreliable; hence it is possible that the private corporate sector output has been overestimated. For example, the Ministry’s database on “active” companies — that is companies claiming to have submitted audited financial results regularly for three years — seems to contain many companies that are actually inactive (not producing output on a regular basis). Last year when the National Sample Survey Office (the government’s premier, independent, data-gathering agency), used the Ministry of Corporate Affairs list of active companies to canvass a sample of companies in the services sector, it found that up to 42% of the sample companies were not traceable, had failed to provide the information for the survey, or had failed to provide audited accounts.

For estimating GDP of the private corporate sector, questionable methods are also used for blowing-up unverified “sample” data into estimates for the unknown and varying universe of “working” or active companies.

State domestic product (SDP) estimation uses many of the same databases and methodologies used in all-India GDP estimation. The methodological changes made in the 2011-12 base-year revision have adversely impacted the quality of SDP estimates on two counts. First, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs data does not have factory identifiers (that is, location of production units, but only has the location of the company head office); it has distorted distribution of the SDP estimates across States. Second, for estimating value-added in the informal or unorganised sector, State-specific labour productivity estimates are unavailable in the 2011-12 series. Hence the method used distorts output estimation.

The CSO has denied the claim that the underlying methodology is flawed and that there are serious problems with the new database being used. The official response throughout the debate has been that the 2011-12 GDP series follows global best practices (meaning, following the latest United Nations System of National Accounts guidelines) and applies better methods using much larger datasets; hence the official estimates are blemish-less. This ignores the fact that India has always followed UN guidelines, and that larger data sets are not necessarily better.

Need for a review

The proposed change over to a new base-year of 2017-18, is, in principle, a welcome decision. However, considering the methodological disputes and data related questions relating to the current national accounts series, as illustrated above, what would the rebasing potentially accomplish? Doubts will persist so long as the underlying methodological apparatus remains the same; feeding it with up-to-date data is unlikely to improve its quality.

In view of the problems with the current series, a chorus of academic and public voices has proposed setting up an independent commission of national and international experts to review the GDP methodology. The ideal time to do this would be now so that solutions could be found and incorporated into the new GDP series. Conversely, if a new rebased series is introduced without any changes it will only entrench the existing methodological problems, and ensuring that the debate will continue for the next half decade. And as the debate continues, so will the loss of credibility.